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ARTICLES 
UNLIMITED DATA SEARCH PLAN: 
WARRANTLESS BORDER SEARCH OF 
MOBILE DEVICE DATA LIKELY 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE 




The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide United 
States citizens the protection of fundamental rights under their 
respective Due Process Clauses.1  These fundamental rights 
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this Article are the author’s own. Special thanks to Dean Michael Kaufman, 
Professor Barry Sullivan, Professor Spencer Waller, Professor Sacha Coupet, and 
Professor John Breen for their expertise, insight, and encouragement with regard to 
this Article. Also, I am grateful to my Research Assistants, Jessica Sos and Nina 
Hintlian, who assisted me with editing, cite-checking, and researching of this 
Article. In addition, I would like to thank the wonderful editorial board and staff at 
the St. John’s Law Review. Finally, my heartfelt thanks for the support and 
encouragement of my three sons, Roshan, Finn, and Leo, as well as the constant 
support and encouragement of my wife Noreen, without which I would not be able to 
complete this work. 
1 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (finding “[t]he right to 
marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from 
ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how 
constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era. Many 
who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and 
honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are 
disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law 
and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State 
itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is 
then denied. Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same 
legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and 
diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (explaining “[o]ur opinions applying the 
doctrine known as ‘substantive due process’ hold that the Due Process Clause 
prohibits States from infringing fundamental liberty interests, unless the 
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likely include the right to informational privacy—the right to 
keep one’s personal information private.2  The claim that the 
right to informational privacy is fundamental is further bolstered 
by recent United States Supreme Court cases finding that 
personal data, such as email and social media, accessible through 
a mobile device, require a heightened level of constitutional 
protection.3 
The government intrudes on the right to informational 
privacy when the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
invokes the border search exception to conduct warrantless 
searches of United States citizens’ mobile device data at the 
 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest” (emphasis in 
original)); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (stating “[t]he [Due 
Process] Clause also provides heightened protection against government 
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests,” including, but 
not limited to, the right to marry, the right to direct the education and upbringing of 
one’s children, the right to marital privacy, the right to use contraception, and the 
right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. 
NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, § 15.7 
(last updated May 2019) (“Today the Justices of the Supreme Court will apply strict 
forms of review under the due process clauses and the equal protection clause to any 
governmental actions which limit the exercise of ‘fundamental’ constitutional 
rights.”). 
2 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977) (“The cases sometimes 
characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two different kinds 
of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, 
and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions.”). 
3 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (“We decline to grant 
the state unrestricted access to a wireless carrier's database of physical location 
information. In light of the deeply revealing nature of [cell site location information], 
its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic 
nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by a third party 
does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection. The 
Government's acquisition of the cell-site records here was a search under that 
Amendment.”); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (“Modern cell phones are 
not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may 
reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life,’ . . . The fact that 
technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not 
make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders 
fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell 
phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.” (internal 
citation ommitted)); see Atanu Das, Crossing the Line: Department of Homeland 
Security Border Search of Mobile Device Data Likely Unconstitutional, 22 U. PA. J. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 205, 239 (2019) (“Although the U.S. Supreme Court has opined that 
the Border Search Exception has limits without providing further guidance, 
established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and recent U.S. Supreme Court case 
law provides the guidance that may require CBP officials to obtain a warrant based 
on probable cause prior to conducting a border search of mobile device data. Failure 
to do so would likely be unconstitutional.”). 
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border.4  The border search exception doctrine states that a 
government official or law enforcement officer can conduct a 
warrantless search of a person and his belongings when entering 
the United States at the border to determine whether the person 
can legally enter the country or is carrying contraband.5 
 
4 Emanuella Grinberg & Jay Croft, American NASA Scientist Says His Work 
Phone Was Seized at Airport, CNN (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/ 
02/13/us/citizen-nasa-engineer-detained-at-border-trnd/index.html (“Facing the risk 
of detention and seizure of his phone [Bikkannavar] turned it over along with the 
PIN. He waited in a holding area with other detainees until CBP officers returned 
his phone and released him.”); see also Amended Complaint at 2, Alasaad v. Duke, 
No. 1:17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass. Sept. 13, 2017) (explaining “CBP and ICE have 
searched the mobile electronic devices of tens of thousands of individuals, and the 
frequency of such searches has been increasing. While border officers conduct some 
searches manually, they conduct other searches with increasingly powerful and 
readily available forensic tools, which amplify the intrusiveness and 
comprehensiveness of the searches . . . . The effect of searches of mobile electronic 
devices on individual privacy and expression can hardly be overstated. Travelers’ 
electronic devices contain massive amounts of personal information, including 
messages to loved ones, private photographs of family members, opinions and 
expressive material, and sensitive medical, legal, and financial information. The 
volume and detail of personal data contained on these devices provides a 
comprehensive picture of travelers’ private lives, making mobile electronic devices 
unlike luggage or other items that travelers bring across the border.”); Inspection of 
Electronic Devices, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION https://www.cbp.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/inspection-electronic-devices-tearsheet.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2018) (“All persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving in, or departing 
from, the United States are subject to inspection, search and detention. This is 
because CBP officers must determine the identity and citizenship of all persons 
seeking entry into the United States, determine the admissibility of foreign 
nationals, and deter the entry of possible terrorists, terrorist weapons, controlled 
substances, and a wide variety of other prohibited and restricted items . . . . You’re 
receiving this sheet because your electronic device(s) has been detained for further 
examination, which may include copying.”). 
5 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617 (1977) (“This interpretation, that 
border searches were not subject to the warrant provisions of the Fourth 
Amendment and were ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of that Amendment, has been 
faithfully adhered to by this Court.”); see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and 
the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 319 (2015) (“Under [a] narrow approach, 
the border search exception exists to allow the government to keep out items that 
should be outside the United States . . . . The underlying right is to control what 
enters . . . the country.”); see also Thomas Mann Miller, Note, Digital Border 
Searches After Riley v. California, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1943, 1996 (2015) (stating that 
an individual’s privacy interest in his digital data content needs to be balanced with 
the traditional government interest of preventing people without a legal right to 
enter the U.S. from crossing the border and preventing contraband from entering 
the country); Das, supra note 3, at 209 (“The initial rationale of the Border Search 
Exception doctrine justifies CBP officials conducting a warrantless search of a 
person and the person’s belongings only to ascertain whether the person can legally 
enter the U.S. and that they are carrying no contraband. These should be construed 
to be are [sic] the metes and bounds of the purpose for a warrantless border search.”)  
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The current administration has made it clear that securing 
the border is one of its highest priorities.6  Border security in the 
current administration includes securing the border both from  
undocumented immigrants entering this country for a better way 
of life and from terrorists who may want to cause harm.7  The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) defines a terrorist as a 
person with an ideology that includes committing an act of 
violence against a country or its people for a political cause.8  The 
current administration believes the search of a person’s mobile 
device data, including data stored remotely but accessible via the 
mobile device, can allow Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) 
officials to determine whether the person is a terrorist and to 
permit CBP to detain the person, thereby preventing the person 
from entering the country.9  The United States government also 
attempts to restrict entrance by promulgating stricter border 
security rules and regulations and by implementing  detail 
oriented vetting in the immigration process.10  DHS rules 
 
6 S.M., Donald Trump’s Travel Ban Heads Back to the Supreme Court, THE 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 23, 2018) https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-
america/2018/01/23/donald-trumps-travel-ban-heads-back-to-the-supreme-court; 
Christina Wilkie & Tucker Higgins, Trump on Closing the US-Mexico Border: 
‘Security Is More Important to Me Than Trade,’ CNBC (last updated Apr. 3,  
2019, 7:16 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/02/trump-on-closing-border-security-
is-more-important-to-me-than-trade.html. 
7 Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court to Decide Legality of Trump Travel Ban, 
REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2018, 2:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-
immigration/supreme-court-to-decide-legality-of-trump-travel-ban-idUSKBN1F82EY 
(stating that the travel ban was one way the United States government hoped to 
secure the border from terrorists masquerading as refugees to do harm to the United 
States). 
8 See Roberto Iraola, Terrorism, the Border, and the Fourth Amendment, 2003 
FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, *V.1 (2003) (“The border exception to the Fourth Amendment 
provides the government with the necessary flexibility to detain and search persons 
and goods in its endeavor to protect the mainland and its citizens against acts of 
terrorism.”); see also What We Investigate: Terrorism, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/ 
investigate/terrorism (last visited Aug. 6, 2019) (“International terrorism: 
Perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with designated 
foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored) . . . . [I]nspired by 
multiple extremist ideologies[.] . . . Domestic terrorism: Perpetrated by individuals 
and/or groups inspired by or associated with primarily U.S.-based movements that 
espouse extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental 
nature.”).  
9 See Inspection of Electronic Devices, supra note 4; see also Das, supra note 3,  
at 210. 
10 Trump's Executive Order: Who Does Travel Ban Affect? (Feb. 10, 2017), BBC, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38781302 (“All travellers who have 
nationality of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen are not permitted 
to enter the US for 90 days, or be issued an immigrant or non-immigrant visa.”). 
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promote this border security policy by likely unconstitutionally 
expanding the border search exception doctrine to more than 
determining whether a person can legally enter the United 
States and whether the person’s belongings include contraband.11  
The DHS rules use the border search exception doctrine to justify 
expanding a warrantless border search to determine whether the 
person is a terrorist.12  DHS personnel, including CBP officials, 
as well as the courts, seize on the broad language of case law 
pertaining to border searches to expand the limits of the border 
search exception doctrine.13  This expansive application of the 
doctrine gives CBP officials almost unlimited scope to conduct 
warrantless border searches of a person and the person’s 
belongings.14  However, the DHS and the courts have wrongly 
interpreted the border search exception doctrine.15 
The underlying rationale for the border search exception is 
that it is reasonable to search a person and the person’s 
belongings at the border without a warrant to determine whether 
the person has a right to enter the country or is carrying 
contraband.16  The border search exception doctrine views the 
border or point of entry—that is, an airport or ship dock—as a 
place for protecting both the nation’s sovereignty and the 
person’s privacy.17  The border search exception doctrine should 
 
11 See Privacy Impact Assessment Update for CBP Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/ 
border-searches-electronic-devices; see also Iraola, supra note 8, at I.6; Inspection of 
Electronic Devices, supra note 4. 
12 See Privacy Impact Assessment Update for CBP Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices, supra note 11; see also Iraola, supra note 8; Inspection of Electronic Devices, 
supra note 4; Motion to Dismiss at 3–4, Alasaad v. Duke, No. 1:17-cv-11730 (D. 
Mass. Dec. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss]. 
13 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT, § 10.5(a) (5th ed. 2017) (“Any person or thing coming into the United 
States is subject to search by that fact alone, whether or not there be any suspicion 
of illegality directed to the particular person or thing to be searched” (citing United 
States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1974))). 
14 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 970 (9th Cir. 2013); United States 
v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 
2d 536, 570–71 (D. Md. 2014). These cases all hold that digital data content from 
respective defendants’ electronic devices can be lawfully searched without a warrant 
based only on reasonable suspicion. 
15 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977) (stating that “a 
border search might be deemed ‘unreasonable’ because of the particularly offensive 
manner in which it is carried out,” thereby finding that CBP officials do not have 
unbridled authority to conduct a border search for any purpose). 
16 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925). 
17 Id.; see also Miller, supra note 5, at 1992; Kerr, supra note 5, at 294–95 (“The 
Supreme Court has held that a border search exception to the Fourth Amendment 
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take into account both the threat from individuals attempting to 
enter illegally or to smuggle contraband and that an individual’s 
privacy interests are vulnerable to border security officials.18 
Courts and some legal commentators have been reluctant to 
impose any limit on warrantless border searches of mobile device 
data or other electronic data based on the border search 
exception doctrine under the Fourth Amendment.19  However, 
framing warrantless border searches of mobile device data as a 
governmental intrusion on a fundamental right, namely the right 
to informational privacy, may shield mobile device data from the 
CBP officials’ prying eyes.  The Supreme Court has found that 
the right to decisional privacy—to make certain decisions about 
one’s life without governmental interference—is a fundamental 
right and subject to strict scrutiny.20  However, the Court has 
waffled as to whether the right to informational privacy is a 
fundamental right subject to the same level of strict scrutiny.21  
This Article argues that the right to informational privacy is a 
fundamental right for three reasons.  First, the right to 
 
applies to property entering and exiting the United States at the border, as well as 
its functional equivalent, in order to protect the sovereign interests of the United 
States in monitoring what enters and exits the country.”). 
18 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 552 (1985) (Brennan, 
J. dissenting) (explaining “[the Fourth Amendment] is, or should be, an important 
working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to 
check the ‘well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers' who are a 
part of any system of law enforcement”) (quoting United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972)). 
19 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13; see, e.g., Eunice Park, The Elephant in the 
Room: What Is a “Nonroutine” Border Search, Anyway? Digital Device Searches 
Post-Riley, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 314 (2017) (stating “this Article urges that 
such a [reasonable suspicion] standard provides the balance that is needed between 
the critical interests of both law enforcement and the private individual”). 
20 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see also ROTUNDA & 
NOWAK, supra note 1 (“There is a fundamental right to privacy which includes 
various forms of freedom of choice in matters relating to the individual’s personal 
life. This right to privacy has been held to include rights to freedom of choice in 
marital decisions, child bearing, and child rearing.”). 
21 NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 158–59 (2011) (subjecting the government 
intrusion to the right to informational privacy to something less than strict 
scrutiny); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977) (implicitly 
explaining that any government intrusion of the right to informational privacy is 
subject to strict scrutiny, but the Act in this case had a screening process to limit 
materials that would be public based on whether it dealt with personal information 
of President Nixon, such that it was sufficiently narrowly tailored to the compelling 
government interest); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1977) (stating “[w]e hold 
that neither the patient-identification requirements in the New York State 
Controlled Substances Act of 1972 . . . is sufficient to constitute an invasion of any 
right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
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informational privacy for mobile device data is equally as 
important as the right to decisional privacy.22  Thus, if the right 
to decisional privacy is a fundamental right, then logic follows 
that the right to informational privacy also constitutes a 
fundamental right.23  Second, recent Supreme Court cases have 
held that mobile device data receives heightened constitutional 
protection.24  Third, the Supreme Court’s rationale for giving 
mobile device data heightened constitutional privacy protection 
stems from the same Supreme Court jurisprudence that 
produced the right of informational privacy.25  If mobile device 
data receives heightened protection and properly falls within the 
scope of the fundamental right of informational privacy, any 
government intrusion into an individual’s mobile device data 
which is not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental 
interest would violate the Fifth Amendment. 
Part I of this Article discusses a case in which a United 
States citizen was subject to an unconstitutional warrantless 
border search of his mobile device data.  Part II explains the 
history and current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence of the 
border search exception doctrine.  Part III explains the way in 
which Supreme Court jurisprudence finds the right to 
informational privacy for mobile device data to be a fundamental 
right.  Part IV discusses the reluctance of some legal 
commentators to find that a governmental intrusion on the right 
to informational privacy is subject to strict scrutiny.  Part V finds 
that a warrantless border search of mobile device data is likely 
unconstitutional for violating the right to informational privacy 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
 
22 Mary D. Fan, Constitutionalizing Informational Privacy by Assumption, 14. 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 953, 966–7 (March 2012) (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599–600). 
23 Id. 
24 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Riley v. California, 
573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). 
25 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474–75 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (stating “with reference to Lord Camden's judgment in Entick v. 
Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials, 1030: ‘The principles laid down in this opinion 
affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than 
the concrete form of the case there before the court, with its adventitious 
circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its 
employees of the sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the 
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the 
essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty and private property . . . . In this regard the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.’”); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct.  
at 2223. 
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I. WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A UNITED STATES-BORN CITIZEN’S 
MOBILE DEVICE DATA BY AIRPORT BORDER SECURITY 
In January 2017, thirty-five-year-old American-born Sidd 
Bikkannavar was detained at Houston’s George Bush 
Intercontinental Airport while returning from a trip abroad.26  
During the conducting of customs and immigration procedures, 
CBP officials insisted on searching his mobile phone data.27  
Initially, he did not comply with CBP officials, as he worked for 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (“NASA”) 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (“JPL”) as a scientist in Pasadena, 
California, and his mobile phone data included confidential 
information regarding his work for NASA.28  However, as CBP 
officials clearly indicated that his mobile phone could be seized 
indefinitely until he complied with their demands, Bikkannavar 
consented for CBP officials to search his mobile phone data.29 
Bikkannavar stated that CBP officials gave him a document 
titled “Inspection of Electronic Devices,” which indicated that the 
CBP had the right to search all people, baggage, and 
merchandise arriving to, or departing from, the United States.30  
Further, it indicated that such a search was mandatory and that 
failure to cooperate could lead to the seizure of the mobile 
phone.31  In addition, the rules indicated that border searches of 
mobile device data sought to determine whether a person 
entering the United States had a terrorist ideology and to deter 
terrorists from entering the country.32 
Ironically, Bikkannavar underwent two previous background 
checks to determine his risk to national security.33  He went 
through a thorough background check to work with confidential 




26 Grinberg and Croft, supra note 4; see also Das, supra note 3, at 211. 
27 Kaveh Waddell, A NASA Engineer Was Required to Unlock His Phone at the 
Border, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ 
archive/2017/02/anasaengineerisrequiredtounlockhisphoneattheborder/516489. 
28 Waddell, supra note 27. 
29 Grinberg & Croft, supra note 4. 
30 Waddell, supra note 27; see also Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 21–22. 
31 Waddell, supra note 27. 
32 Inspection of Electronic Devices, supra note 4; see Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 12, at 2–3. 
33 See Waddell, supra note 27; see also Das, supra note 3, at 212. 
34 See Waddell, supra note 27. 
2019] UNLIMITED DATA SEARCH PLAN 301 
to another background check as part of the Global Entry program 
that allows officials to expedite customs procedures after a 
fingerprint scan.35 
In September 2017, several coplaintiffs, including 
Bikkannavar, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”), filed suit against the DHS in Federal District Court in 
Massachusetts on the theory that warrantless border search of 
mobile device data by CBP officials is unconstitutional under 
both the First and Fourth Amendments.36  The plaintiffs did not 
argue the warrantless border search of mobile device data was an 
unconstitutional government intrusion of the fundamental right 
of informational privacy under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.  As discussed herein, had the plaintiffs made 
such a claim, the court should find in their favor. 
II. BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION DOCTRINE JURISPRUDENCE 
The purpose of the border search exception doctrine is to 
balance the sovereign’s interest in protecting the nation from the 
unlawful entry of people and contraband against a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his person and his 
belongings.37  It allows CBP officials to conduct a reasonable 
search, without a warrant, of a person and his belongings at the 
border.38 
The border search exception doctrine was first introduced by 
the Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States.39  In this 1925 
case, law enforcement officers detained driver George Carroll and 
searched his vehicle for liquor, which was considered to be 
contraband during the Prohibition, within the interior of 
Michigan, not near the United States-Canadian border.40  After 
observing Carroll for months during a sting operation, the law 
enforcement officers suspected him of transporting liquor 
illegally such that, one day, the law enforcement officers stopped 
 
35 See Id. 
36 See Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 11; see also Das, supra note 3,  
at 212. 
37 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); see Miller, supra note 5, at 
1996; Das, supra note 3, at 209. 
38 See Iraola, supra note 8, at *V.1. 
39 267 U.S. at 154 (1925); see also LaFave, supra note 13 (stating that “the 
United States Supreme Court did not have occasion . . . to pass directly upon the 
question of whether routine searches of persons or things entering the country are 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment” until Carroll v. United States). 
40  Carroll, 267 U.S. at 160. 
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and searched the suspect’s vehicle and found several dozen 
bottles of liquor.41  The Court found the law enforcement officers’ 
suspicion from the sting operation to be sufficient probable cause 
to conduct a warrantless search of Carroll’s vehicle.42  Although 
the case dealt with a vehicle stop, the Court stated that there 
were several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirement 
for a warrant, including a vehicle stop and a border search.43 
Chief Justice Taft, authoring the opinion of the Court,44 
stated “the Fourth Amendment protects a person from 
unreasonable searches and seizures” when law enforcement 
officers fail to obtain a warrant.45  The Court found “it would be 
reasonable to stop and search a vehicle without a warrant 
because a vehicle can move out of the jurisdiction before the law 
enforcement officer can obtain a warrant.”46  Thus, the Court held 
that to search a suspect’s vehicle without a warrant is reasonable 
if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to do so.47 
Further, Chief Justice Taft went on to explain the border 
search exception doctrine: “Travelers may be so stopped in 
crossing an international boundary because of national 
self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to 
identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as 
effects which may be lawfully brought in.”48  Thus, the border 
search exception was born in the context of a vehicle stop and the 
accompanying concern that a suspect may flee the jurisdiction 
before law enforcement can obtain a search warrant.49  Moreover, 
the Court explains that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be 
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable 
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which 
will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights 
of individual citizens.”50  Therefore, the rationale behind the 
border search exception is that it is in the public interest to 
ascertain a person’s right to enter the United States and to 
 
41  Id. at 160. 
42  Id. at 162. 
43  Id. at 153–54. 
44  Id. at 143. 
45  Id. at 147–49; see also Das, supra note 3, at 217. 
46  Id. at 153–54. 
47  Id. 
48 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154; LaFave, supra note 13 (stating that border searches, 
since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered “reasonable” by 
the fact that the person or item in question has entered the country from outside). 
49 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54; see also Das, supra note 3, at 217. 
50 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149. 
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search, without a warrant, to determine whether the person’s 
possessions include contraband, because any suspect may flee the 
jurisdiction prior to a search warrant being obtained.51 
The DHS also uses United States v. Montoya de Hernandez 
to justify warrantless border searches of mobile device data.  In 
that case, CBP officials at Los Angeles International Airport 
suspected Montoya de Hernandez of smuggling drugs in her 
alimentary canal.52  When they searched her, they determined 
that she was wearing a girdle and elastic underpants lined with 
paper towels—indications of drug smuggling; from this evidence, 
CBP officials obtained a warrant to conduct a rectal search, after 
which it was found that Montoya de Hernandez was indeed 
smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal.53 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, upheld the 
warrantless border search in that case because the “balance 
between the interests of the Government and the privacy right of 
the individual is also struck much more favorably to the 
Government at the border.”54  Finally, the Court found “that the 
detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a 
routine customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception 
if customs agents, considering all the facts surrounding the 
traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is 
smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.”55 
In contrast, Justice Brennan, in dissent, harshly criticized 
the majority opinion, stating that the search and seizure of 
Montoya de Hernandez were those of a police state and not 
indicative of the freedoms and values of this country.56  With this  
decision, Justice Brennan was afraid that overzealous officers 
might circumvent people’s Fourth Amendment protections and 
illegally search and seize them at the border.57 
Although there have been invasive warrantless border 
searches ostensibly justified by the border search exception 
doctrine, as indicated by Supreme Court jurisprudence, the 
border search exception doctrine only allows for law enforcement 
officials at the border to conduct a warrantless border search to 
 
51 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–54; see also Kerr, supra note 5, at 319. 
52 473 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1985). 
53 Id. at 534. 
54 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540 (internal citations omitted); see also 
Das, supra note 3, at 219. 
55 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. 
56 Id. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
57 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 553; see also Das, supra note 3, at 220. 
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ascertain whether a person can legally enter the United States or 
is carrying contraband.  Any more may be an unconstitutional 
government intrusion on the fundamental right to informational 
privacy, as discussed herein. 
III.  SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE HOLDS THAT THE RIGHT 
TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY FOR MOBILE DEVICE DATA IS A 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that 
“[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”58  Supreme Court jurisprudence 
dictates that fundamental rights stem from the Due Process 
Clause.59  Further, the Court has deemed that fundamental 
rights require heightened protection from any government 
intrusion—for example, statutes, regulations, and government 
agency rules—such that these intrusions are subject to strict 
scrutiny.60  That is, the government intrusion must be narrowly 
tailored to promote a compelling government interest.61  The 
Court has held that the constitutional privacy right is a 
fundamental right62 and has separated it into two categories: the 
right to informational privacy and the right to decisional 
privacy.63  The right to informational privacy includes the right to 
control the disclosure of personal information without 
government interference.64  The right to decisional privacy 
includes, among other things, the right to marry, the right to 
control the upbringing of one’s children, and the right to certain 
private intimate relations.65  The Supreme Court has held that 
 
58 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
59 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
60 Id. at 721; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1267, 1283 (2007) (stating that government intrusion of fundamental rights is 
subject to strict scrutiny, starting from Roe v. Wade). 
61 Fallon, supra note 60, at 1284. 
62 Lee Goldman, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 601, 
602 (2006) (stating “a conceptualization of a central branch of the fundamental 
rights doctrine [is] the constitutional right to privacy”). 
63 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–99 (1977); see also Fan, supra note 22, at 
966 (“From its start, informational privacy was linked to decisional privacy from the 
common concern of state interference with the autonomy of choice.”). 
64 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598–99; see also NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 
(2011); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977). 
65 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see also Fan, supra note 
22, at 959–66; Goldman, supra note 62, at 604–11. 
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the right to decisional privacy is fundamental.66  However, the 
Court has been less clear on whether the right to informational 
privacy is as well.67 
Characterizing the right to informational privacy as 
fundamental would subject any governmental intrusion on one’s 
right of informational privacy to strict scrutiny.68  Thus, the 
governmental intrusion must be narrowly tailored to promote a 
compelling government interest; else, the intrusion is 
unconstitutional.69  Using warrantless border searches of United 
States citizens’ mobile device data as an example of a 
government intrusion on the right to informational privacy, 
recent Supreme Court case law bolsters the constitutional 
protection for mobile device data; this thereby elevates the right 
to informational privacy with regard to mobile device data to a 
fundamental right, such that a warrantless border search of 
mobile device data should be subject to strict scrutiny.70 
Further, a government intrusion can comport with one 
aspect of the Constitution but violate another.71  For example, 
although the warrantless border search of mobile device data 
may be found to be constitutional under the border search 
exception doctrine in view of the Fourth Amendment, the 
warrantless border search of mobile device data can be found to 
be an unconstitutional government intrusion on the right to 
informational privacy under the Fifth Amendment.72  This 
asymmetry is even more apparent when the constitutional 
provisions at issue are the search and seizure provisions of the 
Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
 
66 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015); see also Goldman, supra 
note 62, at 604–611; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 1. 
67 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04; Nelson, 562 U.S. at 159; see also Fan, supra 
note 22, at 968–69. 
68 Fallon, supra note 60, at 1269. 
69 Id. at 1268. 
70 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (discussing mobile device data). 
71 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) 
(explaining that an illegal search of a person is not simply a trespass but the “right 
to be let alone” anywhere). Further, stating that if Fourth Amendment protections 
are not available, the Fifth Amendment should protect a person’s privacy—“[i]n this 
regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.” Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). Olmstead was eroded to the point that it was overruled by Katz 
v. United States, the case which provides the basis for modern Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence with Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy test. 389 U.S. 
347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
72 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
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Amendment; these two rights can overlap such that when one 
right does not protect a constitutional privacy interest, the other 
may do so.73 
The constitutional right to privacy under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments can be 
classified into two categories: (1) the right to informational 
privacy that involves protecting private personal matters from 
government intrusion such as medical records and electronic 
information, and (2) the right to decisional privacy that prevents 
government interference in personal decision making such as 
marital decisions, child rearing, and intimate personal relations, 
each of which the Supreme Court as discussed in several 
different cases.74 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding the Right to 
Informational Privacy and the Right to Decisional Privacy 
Regarding the first category, there are three Supreme Court 
cases that explicitly deal with the constitutional right to 
informational privacy: Whalen v. Roe, Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services, and NASA v. Nelson.75  The constitutional right 
to informational privacy can be defined as the right of a person to 
control the disclosure of his or her personal matters, as 
articulated in Whalen.76  Nixon further cultivated the 
constitutional right to informational privacy in the context of 
presidential recordings.77  Moreover, Nelson acknowledged that 
there is some constitutional protection for personal information 
but not under the circumstances of that case.78  However, the 
Court in Nelson was reluctant to clearly state whether the right 
to informational privacy is a fundamental right, thereby causing 
confusion on whether strict scrutiny applies to a government 
intrusion into the right to informational privacy.79 
 
 
73 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2253 (Alito, J., dissenting); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
74 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 583, 598–600 (1977). 
75 NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598–600; 
Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs, 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); see also Fan, supra note 22, 
at 968–69. 
76 429 U.S. at 598–600. 
77 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 456–57. 
78 Nelson, 562 U.S. at 158–59. 
79 Fan, supra note 22, at 982; see also Nelson, 562 U.S. at 158–59. 
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The second category, the right to decisional privacy, stems 
from Griswold v. Connecticut and is bolstered by Obergefell v. 
Hodges, along with other cases.80  This line of cases cements the 
constitutional right to decisional privacy as fundamental, and 
any governmental intrusion into this privacy right is subject to 
strict scrutiny.81  The right to privacy comprises both the rights 
to informational privacy and decisional privacy; therefore, if 
decisional privacy is fundamental and of equal importance to 
personal liberty as informational privacy, the right to 
informational privacy should also be regarded as a fundamental 
right subject to strict scrutiny.82 
Scholars attribute Whalen v. Roe as the Supreme Court’s 
first recognition of the right to informational privacy.83  Issued in 
1977, a few years after the decisional privacy case Griswold v. 
Connecticut, the Court delivered its opinion with the backdrop of 
recognizing fundamental rights inherent in the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, including both 
aspects of the constitutional right to privacy.84 
Whalen considered the New York State Controlled 
Substances Act, which required disclosing to a government 
agency the names and addresses of each person who obtained 
certain drugs through a physician’s prescription.85  The purpose 
of the law was to track whether certain drugs were being 
diverted into a black market through corrupt pharmacists 
refilling prescriptions for unwitting patients.86  However, 
 
80 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965); see ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 1; Goldman, supra 
note 62, at 604–05. 
81 Fallon, supra note 60, at 1283. 
82 Fan, supra note 22, at 966–67 (stating that informational privacy has always 
been linked to decisional privacy because they have “the common concern of state 
interference with autonomy of choice”); see also Fallon, supra note 60, at 1283. 
Professor Fan also quotes District Court Judge Robert L. Carter, who stated: 
The concept of privacy is an affirmation of the importance of certain aspects 
of the individual and his desired freedom from needless outside 
interference. It is sometimes described as a sphere of space that a man may 
carry with him which is protected from unwarranted outside intrusion, as 
the right of selected disclosures about oneself and as a right of personal 
autonomy. 
Fan, supra note 22, at 966–67. 
83 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977); see also Fan, supra note 22, at 955. 
84 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Whalen, 429 U.S. at  
598–99; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973). 
85 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591. 
86 Id. at 591–92. 
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patients believed that disclosure of their names, even though 
only to a government agency, would be damaging to their 
reputation by stigmatizing them as drug addicts.87  A group of 
patients challenged the statute as a violation of their 
“constitutionally protected rights of privacy.”88 
Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion and found 
that there are two different kinds of privacy interests provided by 
the Constitution.89  Specifically, he stated that “[o]ne is the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,” 
construed as the right to informational privacy, “and another is 
the interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions,” construed as the right to decisional 
privacy.90  Further, the Court found that the right to 
informational privacy is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.91  Moreover, the Court enacted a balancing test 
between the health of the community to prevent prescription 
drugs from falling into the black market and the patients’ right 
to informational privacy.92  After balancing the benefits of the 
statute with the invasion on the patients’ privacy rights, the 
Court held that the statute’s disclosure requirements did not 
constitute an impermissible invasion on “any right or liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”93 
Justice Stevens cited Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead 
v. United States in stating that there is a right to informational 
privacy.94  Olmstead was a telephone wiretapping case in which 
the Court held there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment 
where law enforcement does not trespass on a person’s 
property.95  Justice Brandeis emphatically stated that the 
Constitution provides the “right to be let alone,” or to be free 
from government intrusion.96  Seizing on this language, the Court 
in Whalen established the right to informational privacy.97 
 
87 Id. at 595. 
88 Id. at 591. 
89 Id. at 599–600. 
90 Id. at 599–600. 
91 Id. at 603–04. 
92 Id. at 602. 
93 Id. at 603–04. 
94 Id. at 599 n.25 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J. dissenting)). 
95 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 468. 
96 Id. at 478. 
97 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599; see supra note 71 (discussing that Olmstead was 
eroded over decades and overturned by Katz). 
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In his concurrence in Whalen, Justice Brennan stated that 
the statute discloses patients’ personal information to only a 
small number of state health officials with a legitimate interest 
in the information.98  However, Justice Brennan argued that 
disclosure to a wide array of people “would clearly implicate 
constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably 
be justified only by compelling state interests.”99  The use of 
“compelling state interest” language implies that the right to 
informational privacy is subject to strict scrutiny.100  Thus, the 
majority opinion set the precedent by establishing the 
constitutional right to informational privacy, and Justice 
Brennan further stated that the right to informational privacy is 
subject to strict scrutiny, implicitly establishing the right to 
informational privacy as fundamental, like its decisional privacy 
counterpart.101 
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, decided a few 
months after Whalen, the Court dealt with releasing President 
Nixon’s recordings that were made during his presidency.102  
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court regarding 
whether the release of the recordings violated President Nixon’s 
constitutional privacy interests.103  President Nixon was 
compelled to release the recordings to the Administrator of 
General Services under the Presidential Recordings and 
Materials Preservation Act (“Act”).104  Further, the Administrator 
was to screen the recordings for personal information regarding 
the President and only release recordings that were pertinent to 
the public.105  In light of this screening process, Justice Brennan 
found that President Nixon’s privacy interest in his personal 
communications was outweighed by the compelling state interest 
in having recordings pertinent to the public be released using the 
the strict scrutiny rubric.106  That is, Justice Brennan stated that 
the Act’s screening process was narrowly tailored to achieve the 
compelling state interest and that it attempted to keep President 
 
98 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
99 Id. 
100 See id. at 606–07. 
101 Id. at 603–04 (majority opinion), 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
102 433 U.S. 425, 429 (1977). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 433. 
105 Id. at 455, 463. 
106 Id. at 465. 
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Nixon’s personal recordings private.107  Thus, Justice Brennan 
further cemented the right to informational privacy and its 
status as a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny.108  Any 
government intrusion on the right to informational privacy, 
therefore, must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
government interest.109 
In NASA v. Nelson, contract employees sued NASA for 
requiring a background check for employment, alleging that it 
invaded their constitutional right to informational privacy.110  
Justice Alito, in delivering the opinion for the Court, was 
reluctant to acknowledge a constitutional right to informational 
privacy, stating “we will assume for present purposes that the 
Government’s challenged inquiries implicate a privacy interest of 
constitutional significance.”111  Further, Justice Alito found that 
the Government did not have the “constitutional burden to 
demonstrate that its questions are ‘necessary’ or the least 
restrictive means of furthering its interests.”112  Instead, Justice 
Alito enacted a less exacting balancing test, weighing the 
Government’s interest in employing reliable workers that 
perform functions critical to NASA’s mission against the workers’ 
right of informational privacy.113  As a result, the Court held, 
based on this balancing test, that the Government’s background 
check did not violate the contract employees’ right to 
informational privacy.114  Thus, Nelson established that the right 
to informational privacy may be subject to less than strict 
scrutiny.115 
However, as described herein, there are two further reasons 
the right to informational privacy should be a fundamental right, 
the government intrusion of which should be subject to strict 
scrutiny.  First, the right to decisional privacy is equal in 
constitutional importance to the right to informational privacy, 
and if decisional privacy is a fundamental right, so must be 
informational privacy.116  Second, recent Supreme Court 
 
107 Id. at 456–57. 
108 See id. at 456–57, 465. 
109 See id. 
110 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011). 
111 Id. at 147. 
112 Id. at 153. 
113 See id. at 150–51. 
114 Id. at 159. 
115 See id. at 150. 
116 See Fan, supra note 22, at 966–67. 
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decisions regarding constitutional privacy protections of mobile 
device data can be construed to elevate the right to informational 
privacy to a fundamental right, such that any government 
intrusion is subject to strict scrutiny.117   
Discussions of decisional privacy led to Griswold v. 
Connecticut, in which individuals challenged a Connecticut 
statute that made it a crime for a physician to provide 
contraceptives, even to married couples.118  Justice Douglas, 
writing for the Court, found that the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments provided a constitutional right to privacy to protect 
governmental intrusion into a person’s private decisions.119  
Further, the Court subjected the statute to strict scrutiny in view 
of its violation of the constitutional right to decisional privacy.120  
The Court found that the statue swept “unnecessarily broadly” to 
“control or prevent [contraceptive] activities.”121  Justice Harlan, 
in his concurrence, adhered the notion that the decisional privacy 
right to contraception is a fundamental right by stating that the 
Connecticut statute violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.122 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, same-sex couples were given the 
right to marry.123  The Supreme Court case consolidated cases 
from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee.124  Justice 
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and found that 
“[o]ver time and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated that 
the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process 
Clause.”125  Further, Justice Kennedy stated that “the reasons 
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with 
equal force to same-sex couples.”126  In addition, the Court held 
“there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful 




117 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Riley v. California, 
573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). 
118 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
119 Id. at 484–85. 
120 Id. at 485. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
123 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
124 Id. at 2593. 
125 Id. at 2598. 
126 Id. at 2599. 
127 Id. at 2608. 
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It would misunderstand these men and women to say they 
disrespect the idea of marriage.  Their plea is that they do 
respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its 
fulfillment for themselves.  Their hope is not to be condemned to 
live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest 
institutions.  They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.  
The Constitution grants them that right.128 
There are other Supreme Court cases that establish the right 
to decisional privacy as a fundamental right subject to strict 
scrutiny.129  Further, Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan in 
Whalen established that the right to informational privacy is as 
constitutionally important as the right to decisional privacy.130  
The confusion in the current judicial landscape stems from 
Justice Alito’s application of a scrutiny less than strict in Nelson 
without distinguishing it from Whalen and Nixon.131  However, as 
described herein, Justice Alito’s view of the right to informational 
privacy contravenes previous Supreme Court jurisprudence.132  
Moreover, recent Supreme Court case law provides clarity by 
holding that mobile device data requires heightened 
constitutional protection, likely elevating the right to 
informational privacy with regard to mobile device data to a 
fundamental right.133 
B. Recent Supreme Court Cases Regarding the Constitutional 
Privacy Protections of Mobile Device Data Bolster Right to 
Informational Privacy as Fundamental Right 
Although there has been no specific Supreme Court case 
dealing with the constitutional right to informational privacy 
with regard to mobile device data, the Supreme Court has dealt 
with the warrantless search of mobile devices, albeit not at the 
border.134  In Riley v. California, David Leon Riley was stopped 
by the police while driving his vehicle with expired registration 
 
128 Id. 
129 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 1. 
130 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603–04 (majority opinion), 606 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (1977). 
131 NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 150 (2011); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
132 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Fan, supra note 
22, at 966–67. 
133 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Riley v. California, 
573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). 
134 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223; Riley, 573 U.S. at 403. 
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tags.135  During the traffic stop, the police found that Riley was 
driving under a suspended license.136  As a matter of standard 
operating procedure, the police impounded Riley’s vehicle.137  
During an inventory search of the vehicle, police found two 
concealed firearms that led to Riley’s arrest for being in 
possession of them.138  Upon a warrantless search of Riley’s 
person incident to arrest, the police seized a mobile phone and 
personal effects that indicated Riley’s gang affiliation.139  The 
police continued searching the contents of the mobile phone and 
found photographs of Riley in front of a car that was involved in 
a shooting a few weeks earlier.140  Riley was charged with the 
earlier shooting based at least in part due to the evidence found 
from the search of his mobile phone.141  Riley moved to suppress 
the evidence found on his mobile phone on the basis that it was 
found through a warrantless search.142  The trial court denied the 
motion, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.143 
Chief Justice Roberts issued the majority opinion that 
stated, based on Supreme Court precedent, that the purpose of a 
warrantless search incident to arrest is to remove any weapons 
that pose a threat to law enforcement and to prevent the 
destruction of evidence.144  Further, Chief Justice Roberts stated 
that “we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of 
search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one 
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s 
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ”145  Thus, the 
Court subjected the government intrusion of a warrantless 
search of mobile device data incident to an arrest to heightened 
scrutiny.146 
In addition, the Court addressed the basis for the search 
incident to arrest exception by stating “[d]igital data stored on a 
cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting 
 




139 Id. at 378–79. 
140 Id. at 379. 
141 Id. at 379–80. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 381–83. 
145 Id. at 385 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
146 Fallon, supra note 60, at 1283; see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 385–86. 
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officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape.”147  Further, the 
Court found that law enforcement officers can conduct a 
warrantless search of a mobile phone to determine that no 
weapons are hidden within it.148  However, once it is determined 
that the mobile phone is not hiding any weapons, there is no 
need to conduct a warrantless search of the data on the mobile 
phone to ensure officer safety.149  Further, Chief Justice Roberts 
addressed the other aspect of the search incident to arrest 
doctrine by stating that “once law enforcement officers have 
secured a cell phone, there is no longer any risk that the arrestee 
himself will be able to delete incriminating data from the 
phone.”150 
Thus, the underlying rationale of the search incident to 
arrest doctrine is to allow a warrantless search incident to an 
arrest to find weapons in order to protect law enforcement 
officers and to prevent the destruction of evidence.151  The Court 
held in Riley that any further search, including a search of the 
data accessible via a mobile phone, requires a search warrant 
based on probable cause because a mobile phone is not simply a 
communication device but can contain the most intimate details 
of a person’s life.152  These kinds of intimate details are ones that 
require heightened constitutional protection.153 
In Carpenter v. United States, law enforcement officials were 
gathering location information for Carpenter, which was 
provided by his mobile phone to cell towers in Michigan and 
Ohio.154  Using the location information collected, without a 
warrant, from the cell phone carrier, law enforcement officers 
were able to place Carpenter at several robberies.155  Carpenter  
moved to suppress the location information as a violation of his 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment.156 
 
147 Riley, 573 U.S. at 387. 
148 Id. (“to determine whether there is a razor blade hidden between the phone 
and its case”). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 388. 
151 Id. at 386–88. 
152 Id. at 388, 401–03. 
153 Id. 
154 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
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Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, 
holding that although Carpenter provided his location 
information to the third-party cell phone carrier, such location 
information was so integral to ascertaining his constant 
whereabouts that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his location information under the Fourth Amendment.157  Thus, 
law enforcement officers were required to obtain a warrant prior 
to gathering the location information regarding Carpenter’s cell 
phone from the cell phone carrier.158 
The Court found that because location information of a 
mobile device is so intimate, it requires heightened constitutional 
protection.159  Although, as in Riley, Carpenter implicates the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court, citing Justice Brandeis’s dissent 
from Olmstead, found that an individual’s privacy in his mobile 
device data—particularly location information—should not be 
eroded through technological advances in government 
surveillance.160  Further, Chief Justice Roberts cited Justice 
Brandeis’s dissent from Olmstead to find that a person has the 
“right to be let alone” from government intrusion, further 
justifying mobile device data as meriting heightened 
constitutional protection from government intrusion.161 
In the context of searches incident to arrest, the Court has 
held that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant prior to 
searching mobile device data.162  However, in the context of a 
border search, the Court has not yet opined on whether the 
Fourth Amendment provides constitutional protections from a 
warrantless government search of mobile device data at the 
border.163  Further, lower courts have held that the border search 
exception allows law enforcement to search mobile device data 
without obtaining a warrant.164 
Allowing a warrantless border search of mobile device data 
contravenes the constitutional protections of mobile device data 
found in both Riley and Carpenter.165  If the Fourth Amendment 
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is not capable of providing these constitutional protections, then 
the Fifth Amendment may be.166  That is, although a warrantless 
border search of mobile device data may be constitutional under 
the Fourth Amendment, the same warrantless border search can 
infringe on the right to informational privacy.167  Such a rationale 
is in line with Justice Roberts’s rationale and citation to Justice 
Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead, which is the same line of  
jurisprudence from which the right of informational privacy was 
born.168 
C. The Right to Informational Privacy for Mobile Device Data is 
a Fundamental Right Requiring Strict Scrutiny 
Any government intrusion of the fundamental right to 
informational privacy is subject to strict scrutiny for three 
reasons.  First, the right to informational privacy is of equal 
constitutional importance to the right to decisional privacy.169  
Thus, if the Supreme Court jurisprudence finds that decisional 
privacy is a fundamental right, it follows that informational 
privacy is also a fundamental right.170  Second, the recent 
Supreme Court cases Riley and Carpenter have found that mobile 
device data receives heightened constitutional privacy 
protection.171  Third, the Carpenter rationale for requiring 
heightened protection for mobile device data stems from the 
same Supreme Court jurisprudence as the right to informational 
privacy.172  Therefore, if mobile device data requires heightened 
constitutional protection and the right to informational privacy 
covers mobile device data, then the right to privacy vis-à-vis 
mobile device data is a fundamental right.173 
Supreme Court jurisprudence for the right to informational 
privacy—found in cases from Whalen through Nixon to  
Nelson—has vacillated between strict scrutiny and something 
 
166 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Olmstead, 277 U.S. 
at 475. 
167 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct at 2223; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474–76. 
168 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct at 2223; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474–76. 
169 See Fan, supra note 22, at 966–67; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
170 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
171 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct at 2223; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). 
172 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 475 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)). 
173 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607 
(Brennan, J., concurring); Fan, supra note 22, at 966–67. 
2019] UNLIMITED DATA SEARCH PLAN 317 
less, thereby creating confusion about whether informational 
privacy is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.174  However, 
the right to decisional privacy, akin to the right to informational 
privacy, enjoys the status of a fundamental right175  Supreme 
Court jurisprudence relating to the right to decisional privacy 
starts with Griswold v. Connecticut and continues through Roe v. 
Wade and Obergefell v. Hodges, among others.176  This line of 
cases establishes that any government intrusion on the 
constitutional right to decisional privacy must be subject to strict 
scrutiny.177  The right of informational privacy is likely of equal 
constitutional importance as the right to decisional privacy 
because they stem from the same concern by the Supreme Court 
about state interference in an invidual’s right to make choices 
about her own life.178  Thus, like the right to decisional privacy, 
the right to informational privacy should be considered a 
fundamental right, any government intrusion of which is subject 
to strict scrutiny.179 
Moreover, the recent Supreme Court cases Riley and 
Carpenter hold that mobile device data can store such intimate 
details of a person’s life that it requires constitutional protection 
from government intrusion.180  While both Riley and Carpenter 
consider mobile device data through a Fourth Amendment lens,  
the Supreme Court has held in both cases that mobile device 
data requires heightened constitutional protection based on the 
ubiquity of cell phones in daily life.181 
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Further, Chief Justice Roberts, in Carpenter, noted that 
constitutional privacy protection for mobile device data has its 
roots in Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead, as did Justice 
Stevens in Whalen, when he recognized the constitutional right 
to informational privacy.182  Justice Brandeis wrote that the 
Constitution provides the “right to be let alone” stemming from 
the Fifth Amendment.183  Further, Justice Brandeis explained 
that personal privacy and personal liberty are so intertwined 
that “the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each 
other.”184  The portion of Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead 
that Chief Justice Roberts cited to lay the foundation for mobile 
device data’s heightened protection is the same portion that 
provided the basis for informational privacy.185  Therefore, the 
right to informational privacy for mobile device data should be 
recognized as a fundamental right requiring heightened 
constitutional protection.186 
IV. RECENT SUPREME COURT RULINGS SHOULD ASSUAGE SOME 
LEGAL COMMENTATORS’ RELUCTANCE TO FIND THAT A 
GOVERNMENT INTRUSION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL 
PRIVACY IS SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY 
After Nelson, some legal commentators questioned whether 
the right to informational privacy is a fundamental right.187  
Further, some legal commentators questioned whether there is a 
constitutional right to privacy at all due to Justice Scalia’s and 
Justice Thomas’s concurrences in that case, which deny that such 
a right is protected by the Constitution.188  However, other legal 
scholars do accept that the Constitution provides a right to 
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informational privacy, but they find that any government 
intrusion of such a right is not subject to strict scrutiny and 
instead, they put forth that a right to informational privacy is 
subject to some form of intermediate scrutiny.189 
An oft-cited argument that a right to informational privacy 
does not exist is the cliché that there is no such explicit right 
stated in the Constitution.190  However, this belief is hypocritical 
at best, as the Court has recognized time and again that the right 
to decisional privacy—akin to the right to informational 
privacy—is also not explicitly stated in the Constitution, but is a 
fundamental right nonetheless.191  Another reason for the 
reluctance to acknowledge the right to informational privacy is 
the existence of only three Supreme Court cases on the issue: 
Whalen, Nixon, and Nelson.192  A further reason for reluctance is 
that in each of those three cases, the party asserting the right 
failed to vindicate the right because of a compelling government 
interest.193  Moreover, these three cases apply varying levels of 
scrutiny, ranging from strict scrutiny to a simple balancing test 
of a person’s interest against the government’s interest.194 
However, given federal jurisprudence with regard to the 
right to informational privacy and the recent Supreme Court 
cases with regard to mobile device data, legal commentators 
should be more willing to accept that the right to informational 
privacy for mobile device data is a fundamental right.195  Lower 
federal courts have continued to hold that a right to 
informational privacy exists, and the Supreme Court has refused 
to grant certiorari in any of these cases, which may implicitly 
acknowledge that a right to informational privacy exists.196  
These cases range from enjoining the Department of Defense and 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development from asking 
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employees about their drug use and financial history to 
preventing the revelation of the HIV status of prison inmates or 
the personal details of rape victims.197  This all suggests that the 
lower federal courts find that some sort of right to informational 
privacy exists.198 
Further, legal commentators should analyze the Supreme 
Court cases directly addressing the right to informational 
privacy, not in a vacuum, but against the backdrop of other 
relevant Supreme Court cases.199  Riley and Carpenter have 
found heightened constitutional protection of mobile device 
data.200  In Riley, the Court found that mobile devices store and 
have access to the most intimate details of a person’s life, such 
that law enforcement officers cannot freely search their contents 
without a warrant.201  In Carpenter, the Court again found that 
location information of a mobile device contains intimate details 
of a person’s life.202  A mobile device, such as a mobile phone, is in 
a person’s possession constantly in his everyday life.  Thus, the 
location information of a mobile device is the location information 
of the person.203  Such intimate details are held to be 
constitutionally protected from law enforcement officers who 
wish to freely search the phone’s contents without a warrant.204 
In addition, Riley and Carpenter both found that mobile 
device data contains the most private details of a person’s life.205  
Thus, the Court held in both Riley and Carpenter that any search 
of mobile device data requires a warrant.206  In Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, where the Fourth Amendment falls short, the 
Fifth Amendment can protect the right.207  The Court found in 
both Riley and Carpenter that mobile device data is afforded 
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falls under the protection of the informational privacy right, and 
any government intrusion on this constitutionally protected 
privacy interest must be subject to strict scrutiny.208 
Thus, with lower federal courts acknowledging the right to 
informational privacy and the Supreme Court implying as such, 
in addition to the recent Supreme Court cases holding that 
mobile device data merits heightened constitutional protection, 
legal commentators should find that the right to informational 
privacy, at least as it pertains to mobile device data, is a 
fundamental right, any government intrusion of which must be 
subject to strict scrutiny.209 
V. DHS RULES CALLING FOR WARRANTLESS BORDER SEARCH OF 
MOBILE DEVICE DATA ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING 
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
As discussed herein, the right to informational privacy, at 
least as it pertains to mobile device data, is a fundamental right, 
and any government intrusion on it should be subject to strict 
scrutiny.210  That is, the government intrusion must be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.211 
DHS rules that allegedly allow CBP officials to conduct a 
warrantless border search of mobile device data can be construed 
as a government intrusion on the right to informational privacy 
for mobile device data.212  The compelling government interest for 
such a government intrusion, as indicated by the DHS rules, is 
national security, specifically protecting the country from 
terrorists.213  The DHS empowers CBP officials to search a 
United States citizen’s mobile device data without a warrant at 
the border to ferret out terrorists.214  The rationale is that 
searching emails, social media, and other electronic data stored 
on, or accessible from, a person’s mobile device would indicate 
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whether the person has a terrorist ideology.215  There is no doubt 
that national security, including identifying terrorists entering 
our country, is a compelling government interest.216 
However, such a government intrusion should be subject to 
strict scrutiny that it is narrowly tailored to the compelling 
government interest.217  Unfettered access to and search of 
mobile device data is not a narrowly tailored government 
intrusion.218  Such a government intrusion leaves a United States 
citizen’s constitutionally protected right to informational privacy 
at the whim of CBP officials, a situation that can lead to tyranny, 
as suggested by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Montoya de 
Hernandez.219  Further, such an overbroad government intrusion 
chills the freedom of speech, as citizens will be less likely to 
speak out against the government in their emails or social media 
if they know that CBP officials have unfettered access to this 
mobile device data every time they reenter the country from 
abroad.220  This chilling of political speech is against the nation’s 
founding values.221 
Thus, warrantless border searches of mobile device data 
must be narrowly tailored to stave off government tyranny and 
refrain from chilling political speech.222  One way to narrowly 
tailor the warrantless border search of mobile device data and 
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cure the unconstitutional government intrusion is to simply 
require CBP officials to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a 
border search of mobile device data.223  Having an independent 
magistrate decide, a priori, whether the border search is 
constitutional inherently restricts the number of persons whose 
mobile device data is subject to a border search, thereby narrowly 
tailoring the government intrusion of warrantless border 
searches of mobile device data.224  Moreover, a warrant must be 
based on probable cause.225  Therefore, CBP officials would not be 
able to conduct border searches of mobile device data of persons 
that they only reasonably suspect or have no reason to suspect to 
pose a national security risk, but only those that they have 
probable cause to suspect to be a terrorist.226  Hence, the pool of 
potential persons subject to a border search would shrink, 
thereby narrowly tailoring the government intrusion of a border 
search.227 
CONCLUSION 
DHS rules have been promulgated to allow CBP officials to 
conduct warrantless searches of mobile device data at the border 
of United States citizens returning to the country under the 
border search exception doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.  
Such a warrantless border search likely violates the fundamental 
right to informational privacy for mobile device data, as the right 
to informational privacy for mobile device data is a fundamental 
right for three reasons.  First, the right to informational privacy 
is akin to the right to decisional privacy, which has been 
established as a longstanding fundamental right by Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.  Moreover, the right to informational 
privacy for mobile device data is of equal importance as the right 
to decisional privacy.  Thus, if the right to decisional privacy is a 
fundamental right, then logic follows that the right to 
informational privacy is also a fundamental right.  Second, recent 
Supreme Court cases have held that mobile device data should be 
subject to heightened constitutional protection.  Third, the 
Supreme Court’s rationale for holding mobile device data to 
require heightened constitutional protection stems from the same 
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Supreme Court jurisprudence that produced the right of 
informational privacy.  Therefore, if mobile device data requires a 
heightened level of constitutional protection and the right to 
informational privacy includes mobile device data, then the right 
to informational privacy for mobile device data should also be 
considered fundamental. 
Consequently, if the right to informational privacy for mobile 
device data is deemed to be a fundamental right, then any 
government intrusion on that right is subject to strict scrutiny.  
That is, the government intrusion must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling government interest.  Analyzing warrantless 
border searches of mobile device data under this judicial rubric, 
the compelling government interest relating to warrantless 
border searches is national security.  That is, CBP officials 
search mobile device data to ferret out terrorists.  The hope is 
that searching mobile device data reveals a person’s terrorist 
ideology through the search of emails, social media profiles, and 
more.  However, a warrantless border search of mobile device 
data is not the most narrowly tailored government intrusion on 
this compelling government interest.  Instead, obtaining a search 
warrant based on probable cause from an independent judicial 
officer would be more narrowly tailored.  Requiring a search 
warrant provides a mechanism to avoid the potential of searching 
any and all United States citizens’ mobile device data and focuses 
the border search of mobile device data of United States citizens 
that CBP officials have probable cause to believe may have a 
terrorist ideology.  Otherwise, the warrantless border search of 
mobile device data of potentially all United States citizens would 
chill political speech through a tyrannical invasion of 
constitutionally protected privacy interests because of its 
overbroad government intrusion. 
